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Recreating the “Ritual Carving”

1

WHY CONGRESS SHOULD FUND INDEPENDENT
REDISTRICTING COMMISSIONS AND END
PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING
INTRODUCTION
Drawing election district lines to benefit incumbents and
entrench partisan interests is an American political tradition as
old as the nation itself. The “ritual carving and paring” of the
United States into its 435 congressional districts, once imagined by
the Founders as a way to equalize electoral influence, has evolved
into a mechanism for protecting political power in the face of a
changing demography.2 A constitutionally mandated method of
dividing up the population into equal congressional districts has
thus become a tool of political opportunism, and in the process, it
has undermined the very notion of the representative democracy
that it was designed to protect.3
Today, in most states, the task of drawing election district
lines is delegated to a state’s elected officials. Although these
elected officials bring a variety of interests to office, a common
thread across party lines and political positions is that
incumbents want to remain in office. This creates a fundamental
conflict of interest, whereby legislators are elected to represent
and advocate for the best interests of their constituents while

1 Robert Draper, The League of Dangerous Mapmakers, ATLANTIC (Sept. 19,
2012, 8:56 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/10/the-league-of/
309084/ (describing congressional redistricting as a “ritual carving and paring of the
United States into 435 sovereign units.”). Draper goes on to say that what was once
“intended by the Framers solely to keep democracy’s electoral scales balanced . . . has
become the most insidious practice in American politics—a way . . . for our elected
leaders to entrench themselves in 435 impregnable garrisons from which they can
maintain political power while avoiding demographic realities.” Id.
2 Id.
3 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 52 (James Madison) (American Bar Association ed.,
2009); see also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964) (stating that “[a]s long as ours is a
representative form of government, and our legislatures are those instruments of
government elected directly by and directly representative of the people, the right to elect
legislators in a free and unimpaired fashion is a bedrock of our political system.”).
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simultaneously seeking to ensure their own longevity.4 The notion
of political accountability should, in theory, ameliorate this
conflict, but the reality is that tactics such as gerrymandering
have long been the mechanism by which legislators truly protect
their incumbency. When legislatures redistrict, they necessarily
influence election outcomes by “stacking,” “cracking,” and
“packing” voting bloc power with carefully placed district lines.5
By carefully selecting who votes where, legislators are able to
martial and regulate voting power to quell opposition and ensure
victory. In the process, districts coil, meander, and splinter
through neighborhoods and tend to look more like Rorschach-test
inkblots than like cohesive voting communities.6
Consider North Carolina’s twelfth congressional district,
one of the most gerrymandered in the nation.7 Known to many as
the “I-85 district,” it winds narrowly for 160 miles from Greensboro
to Charlotte and in some places is no wider than the highway’s
right-of-way.8 It covers ten counties, five of which are split into
three different districts, and it bifurcates several towns and
communities in its path.9 One state legislator commented that
“[i]f you drove down the interstate with both car doors open, you’d
kill most of the people in the district.”10 Or take Maryland’s third

4 See Brief for Amici Curiae Thomas Mann and Norman Ornstein in Support
of Appellees at 22, Ariz. State Leg. v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, No. 13-1314
(Jan. 23, 2015).
5 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 670 (1993) (White, J., dissenting). “‘Cracking’
is dividing a minority group among various districts so that it possesses a majority in
no single district; ‘stacking’ is placing a large minority population in the same district
as a larger white population; and ‘packing’ is creating concentrated districts of
minorities, thus limiting the number of districts in which minority voting may have an
effect.” Andrew J. Clarkowski, Shaw v. Reno and Formal Districting Criteria: A Short
History of a Jurisprudence that Failed in Wisconsin, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 271, 284 n.96
(1995) (quoting Shaw, 509 U.S. at 670). Although these terms are traditionally used to
describe methods of racial gerrymandering, partisan gerrymandering relies on similar
tactics. See Sam Wang, Gerrymandering Creates a Point of Weakness, PRINCETON
ELECTION CONSORTIUM (Oct. 9, 2013, 3:45 PM), http://election.princeton.edu/2013/
10/09/partisan-gerrymanderings-hidden-burden/.
6 Griff Palmer & Michael Cooper, How Maps Helped Republicans Keep an
Edge in the House, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/
15/us/politics/redistricting-helped-republicans-hold-onto-congress.html?pagewanted=
all&_r=0.
7 Christopher Ingraham, America’s Most Gerrymandered Congressional
Districts, WASH. POST (May 15, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/
wp/2014/05/15/americas-most-gerrymandered-congressional-districts/.
8 Redistricting Task Force for the Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures,
North Carolina Redistricting Cases: the 1990s, MINN. SENATE (July 8, 2003),
http://www.senate.leg.state.mn.us/departments/scr/redist/redsum/ncsum.htm.
9 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 636 (1993).
10 Id. (citation omitted).
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congressional district, dubbed “the praying mantis”11 for the way in
which its insect-like perch splits Montgomery County’s majorityminority population into three separate districts.12 And then there
is Pennsylvania’s “tortured-looking”13 seventh congressional
district, which touches five counties and is as narrow as 800 feet
across in some places.14
This type of gerrymandering occurs throughout the United
States. By manipulating district lines, legislators are able to
affect reelection rates and, in turn, the overall competitiveness of
elections. It is especially illuminating that members of Congress
continue to be reelected by overwhelming margins despite
historically low approval ratings. Congress’s approval ratings in
2012 hit a then all-time low of 10%.15 Yet in the 2012 congressional
election, 90% of House members and 91% of Senators were
reelected.16 Again, in 2013, Congress’s approval ratings reached a
new all-time low of 9%, with an average rating for the year of just
14%.17 But in the 2014 midterm elections, more than 94% of
congressional incumbents who sought reelection held their
seats.18 “It used to be that . . . once every two years voters elected
their representatives, and now, instead, it’s every ten years the
representatives choose their constituents. . . . Congressmen are
more likely to die or be indicted than they are to lose a seat.”19
11 Aaron Blake, Name that District Contest Winner: ‘The Praying Mantis’,
WASH. POST (Oct. 13, 2011, 4:30 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/thefix/post/name-that-district-contest-winner-the-praying-mantis/2011/10/13/gIQAQ7w
4hL_blog.html.
12 Ben Pershing & Aaron C. Davis, Donna Edwards, Montgomery Officials Line
Up Against Redistricting Map, WASH. POST (Oct. 11, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
local/dc-politics/donna-edwards-montgomery-officials-line-up-against-redistricting-map/
2011/10/11/gIQAljKhdL_story.html.
13 Aaron Blake, Name that District Contest Winner: ‘Goofy Kicking Donald
Duck’, WASH. POST (Dec. 29, 2011, 4:03 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
the-fix/post/name-that-district-contest-winner-goofy-kicking-donald-duck/2011/12/29/
gIQA2Fa2OP_blog.html.
14 Doron Taussig, Getting to Know the Ridiculous New 7th Congressional
District, PHILLY.COM (Dec. 15, 2011, 10:23 PM), http://www.philly.com/philly/blogs/ourmoney/Getting-to-know-the-ridiculous-new-7th-congressional-district.html.
15 Frank Newport, Congress’ Job Approval at New Low of 10%, GALLUP (Feb.
8, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/poll/152528/congress-job-approval-new-low.aspx.
16 Charles Mahtesian, 2012 Reelection Rate: 90 percent, POLITICO (Dec. 13,
2012, 12:12 PM), http://www.politico.com/blogs/charlie-mahtesian/2012/12/reelectionrate-percent-151898.html.
17 Frank Newport, Congressional Approval Sinks to Record Low, GALLUP (Nov.
12, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/165809/congressional-approval-sinks-record-low.aspx.
18 United States Congress Elections, 2014, BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/
United_States_Congress_elections, _2014 (last visited Jan. 22, 2015).
19 Jeffrey Toobin, Drawing the Line: Will Tom DeLay’s Redistricting in Texas Cost
Him His Seat? NEW YORKER (Mar. 6, 2006), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/
2006/03/06/drawing-the-line-3 (quoting Pamela Karlan, professor at Stanford Law School).
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With so little turnover in congressional representation, partisan
interests run deep.
Although Congressional stagnation cannot be attributed to
any one factor, partisan gerrymandering plays a significant role
by reducing the competitiveness of elections, contributing to the
systemic entrenchment of partisan interests, and perpetuating
congressional deadlock, among other problems.20 As long as
congressional redistricting is delegated solely to the legislators
themselves, this conflict of interest will be insurmountable.
Although some states have begun to look more critically at the
way their redistricting processes work, that is only a recent
development, and 200 or more years of gerrymandering continues
to eclipse the reform efforts of a few states. Furthermore, a waitand-see approach to state-level reform leaves the nation without
any consistent standards for independent redistricting.
As such, this note argues that Congress, under its
Elections Clause power to “make or alter”21 state election
administration, should begin to regulate states’ congressional
redistricting practices by funding independent redistricting
commissions and establishing guidelines for the organization
and accountability of those commissions. Federal regulation of
the process would create consistency across states through
concrete, rule-based reform, rather than through the stipulation
of certain outcomes. Furthermore, it would allow individual
states to create redistricting commissions based on their own
needs and expertise and would establish workable rules for
ensuring the independence of those commissions.
Because of the political realities of congressional action on
such regulation,22 this note further argues that rather than a
federal mandate, Congress should first make funding available to
the states to implement independent redistricting commissions,
similar to the way the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) allocated
federal funding for state election administration contingent upon
compliance with baseline reform measures.23 HAVA mandated
certain nationwide election administration procedures, but
20 Brief for Amici Curiae, supra note 4, at 3-4 (stating that “when the districtdrawing process is controlled by elected officials, the result too often is a process
dominated by self-interest and partisan manipulation. The consequences are twofold:
diminished electoral competition, which insulates Representatives from their
constituents; and an increasingly polarized Congress that takes cues from the most
extreme and politically active partisans, with little incentive to compromise.”). Id.
21 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
22 See Angelo N. Ancheta, Redistricting Reform and the California Citizens
Redistricting Commission, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 109, 139 (2014).
23 Help America Vote Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301-15545 (2002).
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otherwise, it required reform only when a state accepted HAVA
funds.24 This optional compliance, coupled with popular pressure
to improve the administration of elections following the
“hanging . . . chad” fiasco that precipitated HAVA’s enactment,
made it a particularly effective piece of election reform
legislation.25 A similarly gentle approach to federal regulation of
redistricting would help to appease critics of federal forays into
state sovereignty26 while simultaneously establishing consistent
standards for nationwide congressional redistricting practices. In
addition to carving out a major role for state agency in the
implementation of federal redistricting regulations, this proposed
legislation would also establish a model for changing the way
states conduct their own legislative redistricting.27
Part I of this note discusses the process of redistricting, the
development of partisan gerrymandering, and current regulations
of redistricting and their inability to address partisan
gerrymandering. Part II considers current state-level approaches to
redistricting and the function and organization of several
independent redistricting commissions currently in place at the
state level. These case studies provide a helpful insight into both
how a federal regulation might best be structured and why a
federal regulation is better posited to bring independence to the
redistricting process than state-by-state reform measures. Drawing
on the state-level independent redistricting commission case
studies, Part III proposes federal oversight of redistricting and
discusses how federal funding might be used to incentivize,
rather than mandate, reform. By funding such commissions, the
federal government could bring a level of independence to
redistricting that has thus far been unattainable in most states.

Id.
Leonard M. Shambon, Implementing the Help America Vote Act, 3
ELECTION L.J. 424, 424, 426 (2004).
26 See
Franita Tolson, Partisan Gerrymandering as a Safeguard of
Federalism, UTAH L. REV. 859, 859-64 (2010); see also Daniel P. Tokaji, Early Returns
on Election Reform: Discretion, Disenfranchisement, and the Help America Vote Act, 73
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1206, 1213 (2005).
27 This note only addresses state-level redistricting of congressional election
districts. Reforming the redistricting of state legislative districts is another analysis
entirely, but reforming congressional redistricting may beneficially inform the way
state legislative districts are drawn.
24
25

1646

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:4

I.

THE PARTISAN GERRYMANDER

A.

The Development of Gerrymandering for Political Gain

To understand why redistricting is so amenable to the
abuse of partisan gerrymandering and why federal oversight is
the best strategy for ameliorating this abuse, a brief consideration
of the process of redistricting and the development of the partisan
gerrymander is helpful. Redistricting is the process by which
legislative and congressional districts are created and recreated
based on the results of each decennial census.28 A state must
redraw its district lines at least every ten years to account for
changes in population and, at times, the number of congressional
representatives allotted to it.29 Federal law has fixed the number
of House seats in Congress at 435 since 1913,30 and thus, House
seats are reapportioned every ten years based on states’
proportion of the national population.31
In addition to the constitutional mandate that redistricting
occur to account for shifts in population, the Elections Clause
delegates the power to regulate the “Times, Places, and Manner of
holding Elections” to the state legislatures but gives Congress the
power to “make or alter” any state regulations.32 Hence, the process
of drawing district lines for both state and federal elections occurs
at the state level,33 with Congress able to act as a check on the
process through its constitutional power to affect state
regulations,34 which includes the power to limit gerrymandering
practices.35 Indeed, in describing the congressional regulatory

28 L. PAIGE WHITAKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42482, CONGRESSIONAL
REDISTRICTING AND THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: A LEGAL OVERVIEW 1 (2014), available at
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42482.pdf.
29 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; WHITAKER, supra note 28, at 1.
30 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; 2 U.S.C. § 2a(a) (2012). The number of
Representatives was set at 435 in 1911 (effective March 3, 1913). This number briefly
increased to 437 when Hawaii and Alaska were admitted as states, but the total
number of Representatives returned to 435 after the census in 1960. Act of July 7,
1958, Pub. L. 85-508, 72 Stat. 345 (1958); Act of Mar. 18, 1959, Pub. L. 86-3, 73 Stat. 8
(1959); see also KAREN M. MILLS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, C2KBR/01-7, CONGRESSIONAL
APPORTIONMENT CENSUS 2000 BRIEF (2011).
31 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
32 Id. § 4; see also Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 276 (2004).
33 Corbett A. Grainger, Redistricting and Polarization: Who Draws the Lines
in California?, 53 J.L. & ECON. 545, 545 (2010).
34 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
35 Id.; Vieth, 541 U.S. at 276; see also Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366-67 (1932)
(stating that “[t]he phrase ‘such regulations’ plainly refers to regulations of the same
general character that the legislature of the State is authorized to prescribe with respect to
congressional elections. In exercising this power, the Congress may supplement these state
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provision of the Elections Clause, Alexander Hamilton stated that
“[i]ts propriety rests upon the evidence of this plain proposition,
that every government ought to contain in itself the means of its
own preservation.”36 Recognizing the need for a federal check on
the administration of elections, Hamilton further argued that “a
discretionary power over elections ought to exist somewhere. . . .
Nothing can be more evident, than that an exclusive power of
regulating elections for the national government, in the hands of
the State legislatures, would leave the existence of the Union
entirely at their mercy.”37
However, despite Congress’s ability to check state practices,
redistricting has long been subject to abuse by legislators seeking
to use the process to protect their own interests. Drawing district
lines is intrinsically entangled with partisan and incumbent
interests, and when elected officials are in charge of redistricting,
there is an inherent conflict of interest. Indeed, the temptation
to use the process to protect partisan and incumbent interests has
been tantalizing from the very start, and states’ misuse of their
redistricting power pre-dates even the constitutional delegation of
redistricting to the states. As James Madison observed,
“[w]henever the State Legislatures had a favorite measure to carry,
they would take care so to mould their regulations as to favor the
candidates they wished to succeed.”38 And in 1812, when
Massachusetts Governor Elbridge Gerry manipulated the lines
of an election district into the shape of what appeared to be a
salamander in order to disadvantage his political opponents,39
the practice of partisan-influenced redistricting got its name:
the “gerrymander.”40
Despite the congressional check on redistricting provided
by the Constitution, “[b]y 1840 the gerrymander was a recognized
force in party politics and was generally attempted in all
legislation enacted for the formation of election districts. . . . [E]ach
party would attempt to gain power which was not proportionate to

regulations or may substitute its own. It may impose additional penalties for the violation of
the state laws or provide independent sanctions.”).
36 THE FEDERALIST NO. 59 (Alexander Hamilton) (American Bar Association
ed., 2009).
37 Id.
38 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 275 (quoting 2 Records of the Federal Convention of
1787, 240-41 (M. Farrand ed. 1911)).
39 Id. at 274; see also Nathaniel Persily et al., The Complicated Impact of One
Person, One Vote on Political Competition and Representation, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1299,
1302-03 (2002).
40 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 274.
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its numerical strength.”41 Elected officials have always
recognized that as long as populations and demographics
continue to shift, incumbents must seek out other ways to
ensure victory. This has led to the manipulation of district lines
to influence particular outcomes.
One danger of redistricting, when conducted by elected
officials, is that it allows the map-drawing party to create safe,42
uncompetitive districts and to allocate political power in a way
that is beneficial to the party in power but that does not
necessarily reflect voters’ actual preferences.43 Because, in most
states, redistricting is the purview of the legislature, the majority
party has significant influence over the process. If the minority
party were evenly distributed throughout the state, the
manipulation of district lines would have less effect on voting bloc
power.44 However, the reality is that the minority and majority
parties cluster in particular areas and communities of interest,
making those regions prime targets for manipulation.45 As one
scholar notes, “[e]ven when the distribution of votes remains
constant, the actual partitioning of voters along district lines can
determine the outcomes of elections and thereby tempt those who
control the redistricting process to manipulate the lines for their
own ends.”46 Redistricting is a tool with which elected officials can
manipulate elections to serve their own interests; it gives
“insiders” the ability to organize the electorate in such a way as to
virtually predetermine the outcome of elections.47
With election outcomes nearly guaranteed, the incentive
for new, viable candidates to run for office is minimal. The
competitiveness of elections is diminished when fewer candidates
enter the field, and it becomes harder and harder to unseat
incumbents. In turn, the political accountability of elected officials
dwindles.48 What creates and sustains the legitimacy of a
41 Id. at 274-75 (quoting E. GRIFFITH, THE RISE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
GERRYMANDER 123 (1974)).
42 “Safe districts are typically ones that contain enough voters of the same
political party as a legislator but not so many that the votes are wasted.” Ancheta,
supra note 22, at 111.
43 Pamela S. Karlan, The Partisan of Nonpartisanship: Justice Stevens and
the Law of Democracy, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2187, 2196 (2006).
44 PETER S. WATTSON, SENATE COUNSEL, STATE OF MINN., HOW TO DRAW
REDISTRICTING PLANS THAT WILL STAND UP IN COURT 5 (2011), available at
www.senate.leg.state.mn.us/departments/scr/REDIST/Draw/Draw.pdf.
45 Id.
46 Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L.
REV. 593, 595 (2002).
47 Id. at 595-96.
48 Id. at 600.
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democracy is the ability of the electorate to check their elected
leaders through meaningful, competitive elections.49 When elected
officials, motivated by their own partisan interests, control the
process so as to eliminate the competitive nature of elections and
ensure their own longevity, they undermine this central tenet of
democratic legitimacy.50
This, in turn, contributes to a more polarized Congress in
which centrist, moderate legislators are absent.51 “Gerrymandering
thus creates a kind of inertia that arrests the House’s dynamic
process. It makes it less certain that votes in the chamber will
reflect shifts in popular opinion, and thus frustrates change
and creates undemocratic slippage between the people and their
government.”52 By perpetuating incumbent and partisan interests,
gerrymandering pushes the voters’ will to the margins, strips
elected officials of their accountability, and limits voters’ choices.53
Furthermore, it leads to a deficit of effective, solution-oriented
legislators and contributes to congressional deadlock.
B.

Federal Constraints on Gerrymandering

Over two centuries of gerrymandering has led to the
development of federal law regulating the process of redistricting.
First, Congress enacted legislation that required congressional
districts to be contiguous,54 compact,55 and equal in population.56
Then, in Baker v. Carr, the Court held Equal Protection claims
of malapportionment in redistricting to be justiciable after a long
history of avoiding such cases under the political question
doctrine.57 The Baker Court established six factors that should
49 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 52, supra note 3. In describing the importance of
the House of Representatives to a functioning democracy, the Founders stated, “[a]s it
is essential to liberty that the government in general should have a common interest
with the people, so it is particularly essential that the branch of it under consideration
should have an immediate dependence on, and an intimate sympathy with, the people.”
Id.; see also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
50 Issacharoff, supra note 46, at 623.
51 Karlan, supra note 43, at 2196.
52 Daniel R. Ortiz, Got Theory?, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 459, 487 (2004).
53 CITIZENS UNION, RESHAPING NEW YORK: ENDING THE RIGGED PROCESS OF
PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING WITH AN IMPARTIAL AND INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING
PROCESS 1 (Nov. 2011), available at http://www.citizensunion.org/www/cu/site/hosting/
Reports/CU_ReshapingNewYork_November2011.pdf.
54 Apportionment Act of 1842, 5 Stat. 491 (1842).
55 Apportionment Act of 1901, 31 Stat. 733 (1901).
56 Apportionment Act of 1872, 17 Stat. 28, § 2 (1872).
57 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210-17 (1962). Prior to Baker, the Court had
long held malapportionment claims to be nonjusticiable under the political question
doctrine. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 370-71 (3d ed.
2000) (describing Supreme Court cases pre-Baker). “An issue is political not because it
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be considered before a case is deemed a political question outside
the purview of the Court58 and determined that, according to
those factors, apportionment was no longer a political question
beyond the review of the Court and was justiciable under the
Fourteenth Amendment.59
Once Fourteenth Amendment claims of malapportionment
in redistricting became justiciable under Baker, challenges to
redistricting practices proliferated, and the Court’s jurisprudence
on racial gerrymandering quickly developed.60 The Supreme
Court went on to hold that congressional districts must be equal
in population under the “one person, one vote” standard in order
to protect political equality under the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.61 As one scholar notes, the Court’s
“one person, one vote” standard envisions a narrow but important
conception of this equal influence:
It cannot mean . . . that each citizen has a right to equal influence over
the political process or even that each voter has a right to an equal
chance to have his or her preferred candidate elected. . . . [E]ach citizen
ought to have the equal probability of casting a tie-breaking vote
regardless of the location of his or her residence, all other things being
equal. . . . [T]he chief evil of malapportioned districts is that some voters
in some districts could have a greater chance of casting the dispositive
vote in the election of their representative.62

Hence, the danger the Court envisioned was that voting power
might be diluted or enhanced based on the relative size of
election districts.63 In establishing the “one person, one vote”
standard, the Court said that “[a]s long as ours is a
representative form of government, and our legislatures are
is one of particular concern to the political branches of government but because the
constitutional provisions which litigants would invoke as guides to resolution of the
issue do not lend themselves to judicial application.” Id. at 370; see also South v.
Peters, 339 U.S. 276, 277 (1950); Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
58 The six factors articulated by the Baker Court are: (1) “a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department”;
(2) “a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it”; (3) “the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
nonjudicial discretion”; (4) “the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government”; (5) “an
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made”; or (6) “the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments
on one question.” Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
59 Id. at 210-11, 237.
60 Michael Weaver, Uncertainty Maintained: The Split Decision over Partisan
Gerrymanders in Vieth v. Jubelirer, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1273, 1290-91 (2005) (citing cases).
61 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 558 (1964) (quoting Gray v. Sanders, 372
U.S. 368, 381 (1963)).
62 Persily et al., supra note 39, at 1311-12 (citations omitted).
63 Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 559.
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those instruments of government elected directly by and directly
representative of the people, the right to elect legislators in a
free and unimpaired fashion is a bedrock of our political
system.”64 Furthermore, in Shaw v. Reno, the Court created
“new structural equal protection” by recognizing the influence of
race in redistricting and carving out a role for the Court on
adjudicating claims of racial gerrymandering.65
Congress established another regulation on the states’
redistricting power with the Voting Rights Act (VRA), section 2
of which prohibits the dilution of minority votes through
redistricting practices and creates a private right of action when
certain preconditions exist.66 And prior to Shelby County v.
Holder, sections 4 and 5 of the VRA provided an added layer of
regulation of redistricting practices in covered districts with a
record of discriminatory voting practices.67 Under the pre-Shelby
VRA, all districts designated as covered were required to submit
any changes to their voting procedures, including the
apportionment of congressional districts, to the U.S. Attorney
General for approval.68 However, when the Supreme Court
struck down the preclearance formula, it stripped Congress of its
ability to regulate redistricting in covered districts through
preclearance and left only post facto litigation brought under
section 2 of the VRA.69 Recourse under section 2 faces many
obstacles, however, as the burden of proof is on the challenger
and the litigation is necessarily complex, costly, and slowmoving. As Justice Ginsburg pointed out in her dissent in Shelby
County, “[a]n illegal scheme might be in place for several
election cycles before a § 2 plaintiff can gather sufficient
Id. at 562.
See Issacharoff, supra note 46, at 631. In Shaw, the Court held that the
minority voters of North Carolina had stated a claim under the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment by alleging that the state legislature had implemented a
redistricting plan “so irrational on its face that it can be understood only as an effort to
segregate voters into separate voting districts because of their race, and that the separation
lacks sufficient justification.” Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 658 (1993).
66 The Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2012); see also Thornburg v.
Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986) (holding that the preconditions to a private right of action
under section 2 include that the minority group must be able to: (1) “demonstrate that it is
sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member
district”; (2) “show that it is politically cohesive”; and (3) “demonstrate that the white
majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it—in the absence of special circumstances,
such as the minority candidate running unopposed—usually to defeat the minority’s
preferred candidate.” (citation omitted)).
67 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2012).
68 Id. at § 1973c(a); see also Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 262 (2003)
(stating that section 5 requires preclearance of redistricting schemes).
69 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013).
64

65
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evidence to challenge it.”70 With the demise of preclearance,
states are only bound to the U.S. Constitution, what remains of
the VRA, and state laws regulating redistricting.
While claims of racial gerrymandering and dilution of
minority votes brought under the Fourteenth Amendment and
section 2 of the VRA remain justiciable by the Court,71 there is
no such recourse for claims of partisan gerrymandering. The
Court’s willingness to open its doors to claims of racial
gerrymandering after Baker did not similarly extend to claims
of partisan malapportionment.72 The Court constantly shied
away from overriding states’ redistricting plans on claims of
partisan gerrymandering, emphasizing that review of the
process was best done by the legislature.73 Then, in Vieth v.
Jubelirer, a plurality of the Court held that “[n]either Art. I, § 2
nor the Equal Protection Clause . . . provides a judicially
enforceable limit on the political considerations that the States
and Congress may take into account when districting.”74
Although Justice Kennedy’s controlling opinion did not totally
eliminate the possibility that the Court might establish some
judicial remedy for partisan gerrymandering, his concurrence
with the plurality has left little recourse for such claims.75
The Vieth decision has nearly foreclosed the possibility that
the Court will ever find a claim of partisan malapportionment
justiciable. And as one scholar noted, “[o]ne of the perverse
consequences of the absence of any real constitutional vigilance
over partisan gerrymandering is that litigants must squeeze all
claims of improper manipulation of redistricting into the
suffocating category of race.”76 However, race and partisanship
70 Id. at 2640 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also McLean Crichton, Note, A
Fool’s Errand: Why Congress Should Amend the Voting Rights Act but Not Section 4’s
Coverage Formula, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 223, 235-36 (2014).
71 See Ala. Leg. Black Caucus v. Ala., Nos. 13–895, 13–1138, 2015 WL
1310746 at *4 (U.S. Mar. 25, 2015).
72 Although in Davis v. Bandemer, a plurality of the Court found that partisan
gerrymandering could give rise to a claim under the Equal Protection Clause, the Court
did not identify a clear standard by which to decide such claims. Davis v. Bandemer, 478
U.S. 109, 123-24 (1986). Furthermore, in the years that followed, nearly every claim of
partisan gerrymandering failed to achieve judicial intervention under the Bandemer
standard. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 279-80 (2004) (citing cases).
73 Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 539-40 (1978); see also Connor v. Finch,
431 U.S. 407, 414-15 (1977); Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 27 (1975); Gaffney v.
Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 749 (1973); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 84-85 (1966).
74 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 305.
75 Id. at 306; see also Justin Driver, Rules, the New Standards: Partisan
Gerrymandering and Judicial Manageability After Vieth v. Jubelirer, 73 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1166, 1173-74 (2005).
76 Issacharoff, supra note 46, at 630-31.
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often overlap, particularly since the Civil Rights Movement of the
1960s realigned political parties and “created a reality in which
today most African American voters are Democrats and most
white conservative voters are Republicans.”77 To create a cause of
action for only claims of racial gerrymandering is, as one scholar
argues, “an artificial way of dividing up a world that has been
dictated by American law and the Supreme Court. . . . [I]f
‘partisan’ factors predominate in the legislature then those
challenging the proposed district lines lose, but if ‘racial’ factors
predominate they win.”78 This distinction prevents legitimate
claims of partisan gerrymandering from reaching the Court, and
even worse, asks courts “to make decisions about what is in
legislators’ hearts” and “search for racist intent” in order to even
hear malapportionment cases.79 This oversimplifies how and why
gerrymandering occurs and creates extreme obstacles for the
justiciability of claims of gerrymandering. Ultimately, it points to
the growing need for Congressional action to create meaningful
regulation of redistricting practices in order to prevent the type of
partisan gerrymandering that has little judicial oversight.
II.

STATE APPROACHES TO REDISTRICTING REFORM

Perhaps in response to the limited federal constraints on
partisan gerrymandering, states have begun to more strictly
regulate their own redistricting processes by implementing
oversight mechanisms for improving and monitoring the way
district lines are drawn.80 On the one hand, these state-by-state
approaches to redistricting reform reveal the inconsistencies and
ineffectuality of a piecemeal strategy for diminishing partisan
influence. However, on the other hand, by drawing on the more
successful aspects of each of these state-level approaches to
redistricting reform, there emerges a useful framework for
federal regulation of redistricting practices nationwide.
Because redistricting occurs at the state level, there is a
wide disparity in how states approach and regulate the process.81
77 Richard L. Hasen, Race or Party?: How Courts Should Think About
Republican Efforts to Make it Harder to Vote in North Carolina and Elsewhere, 127 HARV.
L. REV. F. 58 (Jan. 7, 2014), available at http://harvardlawreview.org/2014/01/race-orparty-how-courts-should-think-about-republican-efforts-to-make-it-harder-to-vote-innorth-carolina-and-elsewhere/.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 277 n.4; see also Grainger, supra note 33, at 545.
81 Nathan S. Catanese, Gerrymandered Gridlock: Addressing the Hazardous
Impact of Partisan Redistricting, 28 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 323, 343 (2014).
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State-level strategies for congressional redistricting range from
independent, citizen-informed redistricting commissions to
traditional, direct legislative control of the line-drawing process.82
The wide variance across states means both that the
implications of partisan gerrymandering are greater in some
states than in others and that there is a startling lack of
consistency in the way redistricting occurs in the United States.
This disparity in approaches to redistricting means that the
degree to which voters’ preferences are actually reflected in their
Congressional representatives varies depending on the state in
which those voters happen to reside. This, in turn, contributes to
a Congress where heavily gerrymandered states can coalesce
partisan power on one side of the aisle, whereas states that
employ independent redistricting commissions for more
competitive elections may ultimately have less sway. Although
state approaches to redistricting vary widely, what they all
share is a deep power to influence the outcome of elections.
Any redistricting plan will have political effects; in that
sense, there is no such thing as an objectively fair plan to alter
district lines. No matter where the lines are drawn, there will
be political consequences for the populations and the elected
officials on either side.83 What reform efforts aim to achieve is
not an objectively fair redistricting plan, but rather, a process
that puts greater emphasis on certain criteria over others.84
Under the current scheme in the majority of states, the most
heavily valued criteria for determining where district lines
should be drawn is the degree to which it affects an
incumbent’s chances of being reelected.85 Redistricting reform
would have criteria such as the cohesiveness of the district and
the degree to which it actually reflects voting bloc power take
precedence over the likelihood of an incumbent’s reelection.86
Asking legislators to use these independent criteria in
their redistricting plans is a tall order; it would require an elected
official to put voters’ rights before partisan interests. There is
little incentive for any elected official to push for the reform of a
process that safeguards that legislator’s job. As such, in most
CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2; N.C. CONST. art. II, § 5.
Jeffrey C. Kubin, Note, The Case for Redistricting Commissions, 75 TEX. L.
REV. 837, 838-39 n.6 (1997); see also Ancheta, supra note 22, at 135-36.
84 Kubin, supra note 83, at 838-39 n.6. (quoting TERRY B. O’ROURKE,
REAPPORTIONMENT: LAW, POLITICS, COMPUTERS 38 (1972)).
85 See Kristen Silverberg, Note, The Illegitimacy of the Incumbent Gerrymander,
74 TEX. L. REV. 913, 913 (1996).
86 See Kubin, supra note 83, at 838-39 n.6.
82

83
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states, the legislature continues to control redistricting. However,
there are a few states that have established redistricting processes
that are more independent from the legislature. The way that the
various states draw their congressional district lines, whether by
the legislature or through some independent apparatus, illustrates
both the problems of partisan gerrymandering and the ways in
which redistricting could be more independent. Hence, it is useful
to look closely at the states’ role in redistricting, the possibility of
reform at the state level, and the obstacles to widespread reform
through a state-by-state approach that lacks federal oversight.
A.

The Traditional Approach to Redistricting: The
Legislature Draws the Lines

Despite the reform measures adopted by certain states,
the majority of states take the traditional approach to
redistricting whereby primarily the legislators are tasked with
drawing their own district lines.87 In the scheme utilized by New
York prior to the recent passage of a constitutional amendment to
reform redistricting,88 the Legislative Task Force on Demographic
Research and Reapportionment (LATFOR) assisted the state
legislature in drawing the state and congressional district lines.89
LATFOR’s funding came from the same bill that allotted funding
to the legislature, and the commission itself was made up of four
legislators and two non-legislators.90 There was ample
opportunity for legislative input throughout the process, and
although LATFOR conducted public hearings on its proposed
redistricting plans, legislators indicated that in at least some
redistricting cycles, LATFOR had already finished its mapdrawing before staging any public hearings.91
LATFOR submitted its plan to the legislature as a bill,
which was then ultimately approved or denied by the legislature
that helped craft it.92 “Historically, this has amounted to
87 Redistricting
101, Redistricting Reform, REDRAWING THE LINES,
http://www.redrawingthelines.org/redistrictingreform (last visited Jan. 23, 2015); see also
Redistricting Commissions and Alternatives to the Legislature Conducting Redistricting,
NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/redistricting/
redistricting-commissions.aspx (last visited Jan. 23, 2015).
88 Proposed Ballot Propositions, N.Y. STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS (2014),
http://www.elections.ny.gov/ProposedConsAmendments2.html.
89 RESHAPING NEW YORK, supra note 53, at 29.
90 Id. at 30.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 31; see also NEW YORK REDISTRICTING MEMO, BRENNAN CENTER
FOR JUSTICE (2010), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/new-yorkredistricting-memo.
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something of a tacit agreement between the chambers, in which
each chamber determines the lines for its own members
independently.”93 There were few rules that LATFOR was
required to follow beyond what was established by federal law,
and this absence of redistricting criteria meant that the process
was used to protect partisan and incumbent interests.94 In its
seminal report on how gerrymandering undermines democracy,
Citizens Union criticized LATFOR’s manipulation of district lines:
Past practices . . . have included: drawing a challenger’s home or
political bases out of districts after having mounted a strong
challenge against an incumbent; going to the margins of allowable
district population size to advantage regions of the state over others;
and the gerrymandering of districts and dividing of communities to
split the vote of burgeoning ethnic communities.95

Four out of six members of LATFOR were sitting legislators, and
all six members were appointed by the legislature, with the
majority party in each house getting two appointments.96 Hence,
the legislature had near total control and oversight of the
redistricting process, with the majority party in each house able
to exert significant influence over how redistricting would affect
majority-party interests in ten years of elections.97
This is just one example of how a state might approach
redistricting and ensure that its incumbents are protected in the
process. Again, because the criteria for how redistricting is
conducted are largely left to the individual states, there is little
consistency in the redistricting rules that each state has
adopted. However, the majority of states delegate redistricting
oversight to the legislature, staff redistricting commissions with
elected officials, and in general, create a process whereby
incumbents are well-positioned to ensure their own longevity.
B.

The Rise of Independent Redistricting Commissions

An oft-touted reform measure implemented by states to
prevent partisan manipulation of the redistricting process is
the establishment of independent redistricting commissions on
which legislators are not allowed to serve. These commissions
vary in their organization and accountability to state legislatures
NEW YORK REDISTRICTING MEMO, supra note 92.
RESHAPING NEW YORK, supra note 53, at 31.
95 Id. at 31-32.
96 Id. at 7-8, 30.
97 Id. at 7-8. In 2014, New York passed a constitutional amendment that created
an independent redistricting commission to replace LATFOR. See infra Part II.C.3.
93
94
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and the general public.98 In its most common iteration, the
redistricting commission has complete control of the line
drawing process, although the degree of legislative oversight
varies widely.99 Other states employ a model in which the
commission only steps in when the legislature fails to agree on
a redistricting plan.100 In at least one state, the commission
advises the legislature on how to draw the district lines but has
no binding authority over the process.101
In addition to the different roles these redistricting
commissions play in the states that implement them, the
commissions also vary in their structure and organization. The
degree to which a redistricting commission is considered
independent has as much to do with its membership as it does
with its authority.102 In the bipartisan redistricting commission
model, both major political parties get an equal number of
appointments. The potential for the commission to deadlock is
high, and each party has the incentive to protect its own
interests and to compromise only to the extent that its
incumbents’ interests are protected.103
Another model is one in which the commission is made up
of high-ranking government officials, regardless of their political
affiliation. For instance, the Texas Constitution appoints the
lieutenant governor, the Speaker of the House, the attorney
general, the state comptroller, and the land commissioner to a
redistricting commission that is formed only in the event that the
legislature cannot agree on the district lines.104 The risk, under this
model, is that the commission will be saturated with members of
the party in power and will lead to even deeper partisan bias in the
redistricting process.105
A third, and perhaps less problematic model, is the “tie
breaker commission.”106 It consists of members chosen by the
minority and majority party leadership in the state legislature,
with one or more additional members nominated by a majority of
98 Christopher C. Confer, Note, To Be About the People’s Business: An
Examination of the Utility of Nonpolitical/Bipartisan Legislative Redistricting
Commissions, 13 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 115, 119-23 (2003).
99 Ryan P. Bates, Note, Congressional Authority to Require State Adoption of
Independent Redistricting Commissions, 55 DUKE L.J. 333, 347 (2005).
100 Id. at 347-48.
101 Id. at 348; VT. CONST. ch. II, § 73; see also CONN. CONST. art. III, § 6(a).
102 Bates, supra note 99, at 348.
103 See Kubin, supra note 83, at 847 n.51.
104 TEX. CONST. art. III, § 28.
105 Bates, supra note 99, at 350.
106 Id.
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the commission.107 Although the incentives to promote partisan
interests still pervade the legislature’s nominees,108 each side will
presumably have to concede to a plan that promotes competition
in order to win the “neutral” tie-breaking member’s vote.109
C.

State Approaches to Redistricting Reform

Although the majority of states follow the traditional
approach to redistricting whereby the legislature draws the district
lines, there are a few states that have begun to implement more
reform-minded strategies for redistricting. Again, these approaches
vary widely, and some make a better showing than others of actual
reform. However, all three of the models discussed infra contribute
to a best practices model for federal regulation of redistricting.
1. Arizona
Prior to the 2000 redistricting cycle, the Arizona legislature
created its own maps of state and congressional election districts.110
In the 2000 election, voters passed Proposition 106, which
amended the state’s constitution and established an independent
redistricting commission vested with the power to draw district
lines.111 The Arizona Constitution now provides that in every
decennial redistricting cycle, an Independent Redistricting
Commission (IRC) will conduct congressional and state
redistricting, and it further provides the organization and
appointment process for that commission.112 Arizona’s IRC has five
members, no more than two of whom can be from the same
political party.113 The amendment also regulates the residency of its

Id. at 350 n.100 (citing state constitutions).
See Brandon L. Boese, Note, The Controversy of Redistricting in Minnesota,
39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1333, 1353 (2013) (stating that “[m]ost independent
redistricting panels are still in their infancy and thus, it is hard to tell whether the
maps they draw are any better than the legislature’s maps. They do, however, seem to
at least present an appearance of a fairer and more objective process of redistricting
than redistricting through state legislatures, even amidst allegations that political
parties are swaying these panels one way or another.”).
109 Bates, supra note 99, at 351; see also Kubin, supra note 83, at 848-49 & n.67.
110 Rhonda L. Barnes, Comment, Redistricting in Arizona Under the Proposition
106 Provisions: Retrogression, Representation and Regret, 35 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 575, 576 (2003).
111 Id. at 577-78; see also Joseph Kanefield & Mary O’Grady, Arizona
Independent Redistricting Commission Legal Overview, ARIZ. INDEP. REDISTRICTING
COMMISSION 2 (July 8, 2011), http://www.azredistricting.org/docs/Meeting-Info/AZIndependent-Redistricting-Commission-Legal-Overview-070811.pdf.
112 ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1.
113 Id.
107
108
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members, such that no more than two of the first four members can
be from the same county. The amendment further stipulates that:
Each member shall be a registered Arizona voter who has been
continuously registered with the same political party or registered as
unaffiliated with a political party for three or more years
immediately preceding appointment, who is committed to applying
the provisions of this section in an honest, independent and
impartial fashion and to upholding public confidence in the integrity
of the redistricting process. Within the three years previous to
appointment, members shall not have been appointed to, elected to,
or a candidate for any other public office, including precinct
committeeman or committeewoman but not including school board
member or officer, and shall not have served as an officer of a
political party, or served as a registered paid lobbyist or as an officer
of a candidate’s campaign committee.114

Hence, the amendment seeks to shield the commission from the
influence of public office and vest the power of redistricting in
the hands of people with less of a personal stake in the outcome
of the elections their decisions will influence.115
Yet despite the amendment’s goal of reform, the election
districts created by Arizona’s IRC were plagued by Department of
Justice scrutiny, litigation, and criticism for their inability to
improve the influence of minority voters.116 As one scholar notes,
“[t]he only solution to these voting rights problems is to return to
the drawing board for clearer guidelines for the I.R.C. or to push
for changes to the federal laws and regulations that would make
them more friendly to Arizona’s . . . approach.”117 And currently,
Arizona’s IRC and the maps it created in 2012 are being
challenged as an unconstitutional delegation of the legislative
authority to conduct redistricting to an unelected body.118 If the
Supreme Court strikes down Proposition 106 and enjoins the
IRC’s district maps, that could portend the decline of state
redistricting commissions that bar state legislature involvement
in the redistricting process.
2. California
California has also turned to the independent redistricting
commission model and has raised the bar for true independence
Id.
See Barnes, supra note 110, at 578; see also Boese, supra note 108, at 1361.
116 Barnes, supra note 110, at 597.
117 Id.
118 Ariz. State Leg. v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 997 F. Supp. 2d.
1047, 1051-56 (D. Ariz. 2014), appeal docketed, No. 13-1314 (U.S. Oct. 2, 2014).
114
115

1660

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:4

with the creation of its Citizens Redistricting Commission.119
California’s model emphasizes citizen participation and
government transparency and diminishes the legislature’s role in
the redistricting process.120 Unlike Arizona, where the commission
on appellate court appointments designates the commissioners,121
California has an Applicant Review Panel, which is made up of
members of the state’s independent auditing agency, the Bureau
of State Audits.122 Legislative leaders get a certain number of
vetoes from the pool of possible members, and the remaining
nominees are chosen through a lottery.123 This veto power is the
only role for the California legislature in the redistricting
process;124 whether this would ameliorate the constitutional
concerns in the Arizona case currently before the Court is unclear.
The California Constitution is clear on the aims of the
Citizens Redistricting Commission and includes prohibitions on
incumbent and partisan influence:
The commission shall . . . conduct an open and transparent process
enabling full public consideration of and comment on the drawing of
district lines. . . . The selection process is designed to produce a
commission that is independent from legislative influence and
reasonably representative of this State’s diversity. . . . Districts shall
not be drawn for the purpose of favoring or discriminating against an
incumbent, political candidate, or political party.125

Of all the priorities listed in the California Constitution, there
is no stated goal of increasing the competitiveness of
elections.126 Rather, the emphasis is on the process itself—that
of preserving communities of interest and creating
geographically contiguous districts.127
Describing the effect of redistricting reform, one scholar and
member of the California Citizens Redistricting Commission wrote:
California’s post-2010 redistricting cycle . . . was independent of the
legislature, far more process-driven, more expensive, and replete with
unprecedented levels of citizen involvement. Did the Commission
ultimately produce the “best maps”? Redistricting reflects a wide variety
CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2; Ancheta, supra note 22, at 138.
Ancheta, supra note 22, at 127; Frequently Asked Questions, CAL. CITIZENS
REDISTRICTING COMM’N, http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/faq.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2015).
121 ARIZ. CONST. art IV, pt. 2, § 1(4).
122 Ancheta, supra note 22, at 118; see also Frequently Asked Questions,
supra note 120.
123 Ancheta, supra note 22, at 118; see also Frequently Asked Questions,
supra note 120.
124 Ancheta, supra note 22, at 118.
125 CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2.
126 Ancheta, supra note 22, at 125.
127 Id. at 124-25.
119
120
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of choices and judgments on how multiple districts might be drawn to fit
together, and there is no one right answer. With more time and
resources, the Commission might have obtained more data, explored
more options, and refined the boundaries to keep more local
communities together or to make the districts even more compact. But
the overall process of constructing the maps complied with federal and
state law and reflected the norms of transparency and
participation . . . . Comparisons of the Commission’s post-2010 maps and
the legislature’s post-2000 maps have shown that the Commission’s
districts were generally more compact, more competitive, better at
advancing minority voting rights, and more successful in maintaining
cities, counties, and communities of interest.128

Commissioner Ancheta’s commentary on the success of
California’s independent redistricting and the obstacles to the
plan are illuminating. He states that an independent body to
draw district lines works “if properly insulated from legislative
influence,” and that having clear criteria, including prohibitions
on the consideration of factors such as incumbent protection,
helps to limit the role of politicians’ self-interest.129 He further
advocates for an expansive role for the public to participate in
redistricting and for tailoring reform efforts to meet the needs of
the jurisdictions they affect.130
Redistricting reform in California is important to
understanding how reform might occur at the federal level.
Ultimately, Commissioner Ancheta deemed the plan a success
that might inform other efforts at implementing a more
independent redistricting process.131 He noted that the two major
obstacles to the plan were time and resources, both of which
would have contributed to an even fairer and more
comprehensive redistricting plan.132
3. New York
In a third but important example of one of the most recent
redistricting reforms, in 2014, the voters of New York passed a
constitutional amendment to revise the state’s redistricting
process.133 The amendment establishes a redistricting commission
made up of ten members. Each of the four legislative leaders
appoints two members, and those eight appointees must agree on
128
129
130
131
132
133

Id. at 135-36 (citations omitted).
Id. at 136.
Id.
Id. at 140.
Id. at 135.
Proposed Ballot Propositions, supra note 88; see also N.Y. CONST. art. III, §§ 4-5.
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the other two appointments.134 Legislators are prohibited from
serving on the commission, and the amendment establishes
principles such as maintaining the core of existing districts and
considering communities of interest.135 There is also a strong
emphasis on holding public hearings; the commission is required
to hold at least twelve.136
In many ways, the amendment establishes a commission
that looks similar to the California Citizens Redistricting
Commission. However, in New York, legislators appoint the
commissioners, and the maps created by the redistricting
commission are still subject to approval by the legislature.137 Public
interest groups have been quick to criticize the amendment for its
failure to establish true independence from the legislature.138
However, other groups have heralded the amendment as building
an important foundation for reform,139 especially considering the
difficulty of obtaining legislative support for redistricting
reform in a state where only the legislature can put a
constitutional amendment on the ballot.140
The debate in New York’s public interest community
surrounding the merits of the constitutional amendment
highlights the political reality of enacting true reform and the
difficulty of achieving actual independence in the redistricting
process. Furthermore, what the debate in New York and this
short survey of redistricting reform efforts make clear is the very
dire need for clarity and consistency in implementing reform in
every state so that voters’ actual preferences for their congressional
representation are reflected in every state, and not just those that
have managed to introduce some independence to the
redistricting process.

Proposed Ballot Propositions, supra note 88.
Id.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Defeat the Referendum, COMMON CAUSE, http://www.commoncause.org/states/
new-york/issues/redistricting/redistrcting-referendum/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2015); see also
NAACP Announces Opposition to Prop 1, READMEDIA (Oct. 14, 2014, 3:22 PM),
http://readme.readmedia.com/NAACP-Announces-Opposition-to-Prop-1/9820708.
139 See CITIZENS UNION, RIGGED TO MAINTAIN POWER: HOW NYS’ 2012
REDISTRICTING PROTECTED INCUMBENTS AND CONTINUED MAJORITY PARTY CONTROL,
(Oct. 2014), available at http://www.voteyes4progress.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/
10/CU-Report-Rigged-to-Maintain-Power1.pdf.
140 Unlike California, where citizens can propose ballot measures. Ancheta,
supra note 22, at 113.
134

135
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Why State Level Solutions are Not Enough to Reform
Redistricting

The redistricting commissions that exist have been
implemented by state legislatures and vary widely as far as their
independence is concerned. Presently, only 12 states delegate
redistricting to a group other than the legislature, and of those,
only half utilize a redistricting commission.141 Furthermore, only
some of the commissions cover congressional elections; in other
states, independent commissions are implemented for state-level
elections, but congressional district lines are left to the
legislature.142 What is perhaps the most striking feature of the
independent redistricting commissions that currently exist is how
little they resemble one another. The number of commissioners
ranges from five to fourteen; appointments are made by everyone
from the Governor to the ranking legislative leaders to the
judiciary; and the criteria for drawing districts, the legislature’s
ability to veto appointments, and the public’s involvement all vary
across the commissions.143 The lack of uniformity is staggering,
and each state utilizing an independent redistricting commission
has faced unique challenges to its attempts to implement
redistricting reform.
In Arizona, the first attempt at independent redistricting in
2001 faced years of litigation challenging its constitutionality.144
Arizona’s redistricting commission is self-executing and does not
require any ratification of the final district maps.145 Challenges to
the commission’s map, coupled with the preclearance requirements
141 Redistricting Commissions and Alternatives to the Legislature Conducting
Redistricting, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/
redistricting/redistricting-commissions.aspx (last visited Jan. 23, 2015).
142 For instance, in California, independent redistricting commissions cover
both legislative and congressional redistricting, whereas in Colorado, a
reapportionment commission conducts legislative redistricting, and the Colorado
legislature conducts congressional redistricting. CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2; see also
Redistricting and Reapportionment, COLORADO, http://www.colorado.gov/cs/Satellite/
CGA-ReDistrict/CBON/1251581558103 (last visited Jan. 23, 2015).
143 Appendix F, Redistricting Commissions: Congressional Plans, REDISTRICTING
AND ELECTIONS COMM. FOR THE NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Jan. 10,
2008), http://www.senate.leg.state.mn.us/departments/scr/redist/red2000/apfcomco.htm; see
also CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(b)(1) (which, unlike other states’ constitutions, requires that
the redistricting commission “conduct an open and transparent process enabling full public
consideration of and comment on the drawing of district lines”).
144 Kristina Betts, Note, Redistricting: Who Should Draw the Lines? The
Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission as a Model for Change, 48 ARIZ. L. REV.
171, 171-74 (2006) (discussing a lawsuit brought by the Arizona Minority Coalition for
Fair Redistricting challenging the constitutionality of the maps, the delays in DOJ
preclearance of the maps, and the uncertainty this created for the 2004 election).
145 ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1 (15-17).
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imposed by the Department of Justice, caused serious delays to the
finalization of the maps and forced the state to resort to temporary
maps for its 2004 elections.146 The first time the lines adopted by
the commission were ruled constitutional was in 2004.147 And now,
the commission itself is being challenged as an unconstitutional
delegation of the legislative authority to conduct redistricting to
an unelected body.148
Although California has not encountered the avalanche of
litigation that plagued Arizona’s redistricting commission, its
Citizens Redistricting Commission faced its own set of challenges.
First, delegating the complex task of drawing district lines to a
wholly new and independent body required time and resources
that were difficult for the commission to determine at the outset.
Commissioners required training, mapmaking demanded
intensive research, and citizen participation necessarily slowed
the process.149 Delays in training led to further delays in data
collection, and the complex task of ensuring compliance with the
Voting Rights Act further complicated the commission’s work.150
Moreover, the commission’s careful attention to the testimony it
received required the commission to change course several
times.151 In addition to these delays, the commission also faced
budget constraints based on the time and resource intensive
nature of choosing truly independent commissioners and
completing citizen-informed, nonpartisan election district maps.152
In short, while the independent redistricting process was largely
successful, it faced resource constraints that must be streamlined
if the process is to be sustainable.
Ariz. Minority Coal. for Fair Redistricting v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 284
F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1242 (D. Ariz. 2003); Navajo Nation v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting
Comm’n, 230 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1002 (D. Ariz. 2002); Poonam Kumar, Ratification of
Reapportionment Plans Drawn by Redistricting Commissions, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
653, 666-67 (2007).
147 Ariz. Minority Coal. for Fair Redistricting v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting
Comm’n, 366 F. Supp. 2d 887, 891 (D. Ariz. 2005); Kumar, supra note 146, at 666-67.
148 Ariz. State Leg. v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 997 F. Supp. 2d.
1047 (D. Ariz. 2014), appeal docketed, No. 13-1314 (U.S. Oct. 2, 2014).
149 Justin
Levitt, Democracy on the High Wire: Citizen Commission
Implementation of the Voting Rights Act, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1041, 1075-80 (2013).
150 See id. at 1078.
151 Id.
at 1093 n.210 (citing CAL. CITIZENS REDISTRICTING COMM’N,
TRANSCRIPT OF STOCKTON BUSINESS MEETING 210-11 (June 24, 2011)).
152 Ancheta, supra note 22, at 118-19 (stating that implementation of
California Citizens Redistricting Commission was “complicated because of the high
volume of applications and ongoing concerns over the diversity of the Commission—
both of which contributed to a longer and more expensive process than expected. From
beginning to end, selecting the commissioners took approximately two years to
complete and cost a total of over $4 million, including over $1 million for consultant
costs to conduct a statewide outreach campaign.”).
146
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Yet the challenges faced by newly installed independent
redistricting commissions pale in comparison to the obstacles to
implementing reform in the more than 35 states that still allow
the legislature to control the redistricting process. Because
legislators have little incentive to change a process that helps
keep them in office, popular pressure for independent
redistricting must motivate reform efforts. The California
Citizens Redistricting Commission only exists because of
Proposition 11, which was an initiative included on California’s
2008 ballot based on citizens’ petitions.153 Currently, only 24
states possess a ballot initiative process in which citizens can
petition to have a new law or constitutional amendment
included on a ballot.154 Of those 24 states, 18 permit ballot
initiatives to propose constitutional amendments, and of those
18, 16 allow direct ballot initiatives, whereby the requisite
number of citizen signatures gets an initiative on the ballot
without legislative approval.155 In the 34 states that do not allow
direct ballot initiatives, the legislature is the final authority on
any ballot measures, and citizens must put pressure directly on
their elected representatives to reform redistricting.
States like Arizona and California provide useful insights
into what does and does not work when a state implements an
independent redistricting process. Arizona, plagued with litigation,
needed a stronger mechanism for the ratification of its district
maps.156 California, which came closer to meaningful reform,
battled the inherent difficulties of implementing a commission
unlike anything else this country has seen. New York managed to
establish an independent redistricting commission, but it had to
compromise on the commission’s independence in order to get the
measure on the ballot at all. Each of these reform efforts provides
a useful case study on both the pitfalls and the necessary
components of an effective redistricting plan. Yet while these
states and a handful of others attempt reform, the vast majority
of states have seen little to no change to legislative control of
153 Prop 11 Redistricting Initiative Constitutional Amendment and Statute, VOTER
INFO. GUIDE (Nov. 4, 2008), http://www.voterguide.sos.ca.gov/past/2008/general/titlesum/prop11-title-sum.htm.
154 What are Ballot Propositions, Initiatives, and Referendums?, INITIATIVE &
REFERENDUM INST. AT THE U. S. CAL. (2014), http://www.iandrinstitute.org/Quick%20
Fact%20-%20What%20is%20I&R.htm.
155 Id.
156 See Ariz. State Leg. v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 997 F. Supp. 2d.
1047 (D. Ariz. 2014), appeal docketed, No. 13-1314 (U.S. Oct. 2, 2014); Ariz. Minority
Coal. for Fair Redistricting v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 284 F. Supp. 2d 1240,
1242 (D. Ariz. 2003); Navajo Nation v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 230 F. Supp.
2d 998, 1016 (D. Ariz. 2002).
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redistricting, and the legislators in those states stand in firm
opposition to reform efforts.
In over two centuries of partisan gerrymandering, only a
half-dozen states have managed any measure of reform. Quite
simply, the state-by-state reform effort is untenable for truly
systemic change. Where it exists, it is slow and often ineffectual,
and where it doesn’t exist, there is no impetus for the legislature
to change the status quo and no possibility of direct ballot
initiatives for the citizens of the 34 states that deny such ballot
access. The possibility for state-level reform will be particularly
diminished if the U.S. Supreme Court strikes down the legislation
that created Arizona’s independent redistricting commission in
the case currently before the Court. If the Court finds that a state
legislature’s delegation of the redistricting process to an
unelected, independent commission is not in fact a part of the
legislative process under the Elections Clause, then any future
state-level commissions will require significant legislative input,
thus removing the very independence that they were designed to
protect.157 The Court has long left redistricting reform to the
legislative branch, and it is imperative that Congress accept its
duty and repair a practice that has undermined representative
democracy for centuries and which, contrary to certain scholars’
arguments,158 has little recourse in state-level reform efforts.
III.

REFORMING REDISTRICTING THROUGH FEDERAL OVERSIGHT

Other than the protections built into the U.S.
Constitution and the VRA, there is minimal federal oversight of
redistricting and certainly no uniform standard for how states
conduct their redistricting and reapportionment. With such
157 There does not seem to be any argument that a federally created
commission would pose similar constitutional problems. At oral argument in the
current case before the Court challenging Arizona’s IRC, Paul Clement stated that:

If Congress wants to do it itself on the Federal level and set up some sort of
Federal commission, I think that would be a very different issue because
obviously Congress has power under the second subclause . . . Congress could
say, we’re going to actually take those commission districts and we’re going to
make them our own, and we’re going to impose them.
Oral Argument at 5:07, Ariz. State Leg. v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n (No. 131314), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2014/2014_13_1314.
158 James A. Gardner, Foreword: Representation Without Party: Lessons from
State Constitutional Attempts to Control Gerrymandering, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 881, 887-89
(2006); J. Gerald Hebert & Marina K. Jenkins, The Need for State Redistricting Reform
to Rein in Partisan Gerrymandering, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 543, 554-56 (2011); Noah
Litton, The Road to Better Redistricting: Empirical Analysis and State-Based Reforms
to Counter Partisan Gerrymandering, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 839, 869 (2012).
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variance among state practices, the greatest successes and the
greatest failures of redistricting reform have all occurred
through state-level plans. Depending on the particular scheme,
states have become both the enemy and the savior of independent
redistricting. However, now that Arizona, California, New York,
and other states have attempted redistricting reform, the
framework exists for a nationwide regulatory system that is
better equipped to preempt the challenges faced at the state level
and implement efficient, uniform standards for redistricting
reform in every state. It is imperative that Congress exercise its
constitutional power to “make or alter”159 state redistricting
practices by passing federal legislation to create funding for
independent redistricting commissions in every state, thus
making the framework a reality.
The virtues of federal legislation to regulate congressional
redistricting are easy to imagine. Congress could establish a
process for states to appoint truly independent commissioners
and institute requirements for service on the commission. It could
mandate that certain criteria take precedence over others when
commissioners choose where to draw district lines, thereby
diminishing the sway of partisan interests. It could ensure citizen
participation and preserve communities of interest. With so many
different redistricting plans at work across the United States,
Congress has the information to craft successful, workable rules
for independent redistricting commissions. And by mandating
independence in the redistricting process, rather than by requiring
any particular outcome, Congress could address the underlying
problem of partisan bias and ensure that, in every state,
redistricting occurs in a consistent, fair way without treading on
the states’ rights to perform congressional redistricting.
A.

Funding Reform: The Carrot or the Stick

This note proposes that rather than a federal mandate of
state-level reform, a more tenable approach to establishing a
federal regulation is through a program in which funding is
available to states to develop independent redistricting
commissions according to federal guidelines. This solution is
modeled on the Help America Vote Act (HAVA), wherein
Congress, for the first time since 1933, made funding available
for states to improve federal elections contingent on their

159

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4; see also Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 275 (2004).
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compliance with HAVA requirements.160 The Act established
certain baseline requirements for all states, but states were not
required to comply with Titles I and II of the Act unless they
accepted HAVA funding.161
A brief consideration of the structure and implementation
of HAVA is useful in understanding how a federal program could
be similarly devised to reform redistricting. Congress enacted
HAVA in 2002 in response to the hanging chad debacle of the
2000 presidential election that left many voters skeptical of the
election process.162 Among a number of concerns about how votes
were being cast and counted in different states, research indicated
that depending on the voting method, the implications for the
final vote tally could vary widely.163
Empowered to regulate elections164 and impose
requirements on states that accept federal funding in relation to
the use of that funding,165 Congress responded by enacting
HAVA, which created an unprecedented source of funding for
states to improve their elections.166 It authorized $3.86 billion for
election improvements and created a new federal agency, the
Election Assistance Commission, to provide guidance on HAVA’s
requirements and to distribute HAVA funds.167 Although HAVA
carved out a larger role for the federal government in an area
formerly left to states and municipalities, that of election
administration,168 it mandated very little action from state and
local governments.169
What HAVA did mandate were certain minimum
standards for voting equipment, which required many states to
update their voting machinery.170 It also required that states
160 Publius, Securing the Integrity of American Elections: The Need for
Change, 9 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 277, 280 (2005).
161 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301-15545 (2002); see also Brandon Fail, Comment, HAVA’s
Unintended Consequences: A Lesson for Next Time, 116 YALE L.J. 493, 493 (2006). However,
“[u]nless a State is specifically excluded from one of HAVA’s requirements, each State must
comply with Sections 301, 302, and 303 of Title III of HAVA as of the effective dates in those
sections.” Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. CIV. RIGHTS DIVISION,
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/misc/faq.php#faq22 (last visited Jan. 22, 2015).
162 Shambon, supra note 25, at 424.
163 See id. at 425.
164 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4; see also Vieth, 541 U.S. at 275 (2004).
165 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; S.D. v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987).
166 Jocelyn Friedrichs Benson, Democracy and the Secretary: The Crucial Role
of State Election Administrators in Promoting Accuracy and Access to Democracy, 27
ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 343, 350 (2008); Daniel P. Tokaji, HAVA in Court: A
Summary and Analysis of Litigation, 12 ELECTION L.J. 203, 205 (2013).
167 Tokaji, supra note 166, at 205.
168 Id. at 203; Publius, supra note 160, at 286.
169 Tokaji, supra note 166, at 205.
170 Id.
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make provisional voting available to anyone attempting to vote
whose name was not on the registration list and create a statewide
voter registration list with certain requirements for first-time
voters.171 However, these mandates all came with funding, and
states were free to develop their own plans for compliance. The Act
had “the effect of moving from an environment of local control with
loose state and limited federal oversight to an environment of
strong state control and loose federal oversight.”172 States were
required to submit a plan for their intended use of the funds that
showed compliance with HAVA’s requirements.173
By creating funding for election reform, developing baseline
standards for that reform with federal oversight of compliance, and
leaving the specific implementation of the federally-funded plan to
the states, HAVA serves as a useful model for envisioning the
federal regulation of states’ redistricting practices. While it need
not mirror the exact structure of HAVA, federal regulation of state
redistricting practices could adopt the Act’s basic principles of
deference to state administration of elections, uniformity in
election administration across states, and funding, rather than
mandating, reform measures. Between the carrot or the stick, this
gentler, “carrot” approach to a nationwide model for redistricting
reform, in addition to being more tempered, would likely garner
the popular support needed to create momentum for the
regulation’s success in Congress.
B.

Proposed Legislation Adopting Principles from State
Reform Practices

The states that have implemented independent
redistricting commissions provide useful templates for creating a
federal regulation. While no single state has a model approach,
state constitutions contain language that could be similarly
adopted in a federal regulation. For instance, California
emphasizes citizen involvement,174 New York underscores the
need to preserve pre-existing political subdivisions, districts, and
communities of interest,175 and Arizona pushes for minimal
legislative control over the process itself.176 A federal regulation
could draw from these states and others, adopting principles that
171
172
173
174
175
176

Id.
Shambon, supra note 25, at 431.
42 U.S.C. § 15403(b) (2002).
CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(b).
Proposed Ballot Propositions, supra note 88.
Kanefield & O’Grady, supra note 111, at 2.
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have proven successful and eschewing those that are unworkable
or ineffective. Furthermore, the regulation could mirror the
structure and organization of HAVA by establishing certain
minimum standards that preserve a state’s power to develop its
own plan for compliance. The regulation would focus on process,
rather than outcomes, and it would provide funding for states to
implement their own independent redistricting commissions.
Finally, the regulation could create a small federal agency to
approve states’ plans, ensure compliance, and distribute funding.
This note does not aim to suggest the exact language of a
federal regulation to create state-level independent redistricting
commissions. However, there are certain principles that emerge
from the states profiled in this note, as well as from the good
government organizations that spearheaded many of the states’
reform efforts, that are central to any meaningful, systemic reform
of congressional redistricting. These principles fall into three
general categories. First, the regulation must address how states
make appointments to their independent redistricting commissions
and who is to serve on the commissions. Second, the regulation
must address the criteria to which the commission is to adhere,
including proscribing certain factors. Finally, the regulation must
address how maps are finalized, including who is able to provide
input and feedback and the final mechanism for ratification. The
following list draws from several state policies and provides a
basic rubric for the parameters of the proposed federal regulation.
1. The Appointment Process
First and foremost, members of a state’s legislature
should neither make direct appointments nor serve on the
commission. Drawing on the models in New York and California,
the commission should remain as independent of legislative
influence as possible and should reflect the state’s diversity.177
An applicant review panel made up of members of an
independent state agency, such as a state auditing board, should
make appointments to the commission.178
The commission should consist of not less than some
number of members, with an equal number of members from each
of the largest and the second largest registered political parties in
the state, and with some number of members who are not
CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(c)(1); N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 4-5.
Ancheta, supra note 22, at 118; see also Frequently Asked Questions,
supra note 120.
177

178
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registered with either of the two largest political parties in the
state.179 The regulation would establish some minimum number of
members and guide the partisan breakdown of the membership,
but states would be free to establish the number of commissioners
appropriate for that state’s population. Members would have to be
registered voters in the state.180 Furthermore, a member could not
be the spouse of any statewide elected official or member of
Congress. Nor could a member have been within some preceding
number of years a member of the state legislature, a member of
Congress, a state officer or legislative employee, or a lobbyist or
political party chairman.181 And a member would be ineligible to
hold public office at any level for a period of ten years, starting at
the date of appointment to the commission.182
2. Redistricting Criteria
Establishing a set of criteria for independent redistricting
commissions to both consider and exclude is essential to uprooting
partisan influence. Furthermore, it contributes to the entrenchment
of democratic values to replace the political opportunism that
dominates redistricting practices at present. At the outset,
congressional districts must comply with the U.S. Constitution
and VRA.183 Districts cannot have the purpose of, nor result in,
the denial or abridgement of racial or language minority voting
rights.184 And under the Supreme Court’s “one person, one vote”
standard, districts must be as equal in population as practicable.
Furthermore, the commission must address specifically and
publicly any deviation from this standard.185
At issue in so many gerrymandered districts is the
mapmaker’s utter disregard for cohesive, logical districts. As such,
districts must be contiguous and as compact as practicable.186
Maintaining pre-existing political subdivisions and communities
of interest should take priority,187 and geographical features such
as city, town, and county boundaries should inform the placement
of district lines.188
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188

CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(c)(2).
Proposed Ballot Propositions, supra note 88.
CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(c)(6).
Id.
Kanefield & O’Grady, supra note 111, at 6.
Proposed Ballot Propositions, supra note 88.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Kanefield & O’Grady, supra note 111, at 2.
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An interesting development in states that have adopted
independent redistricting commissions is the inclusion of criteria
that those commissions are not to consider. This outright
prohibition on certain influencing factors is an important step in
acknowledging what has the potential to infect the process.
Accordingly, districts should not be drawn to discourage political
competition, nor for the purpose of creating or withholding favor
for any candidate or incumbent.189 Likewise, the location of the
residence of any candidate or incumbent should not ever be
considered.190 And when it would not compromise any of the
other principles, a competitive district should be preferred,191
although the emphasis should always be on the process itself,
rather than any particular outcome.192
3. Finalizing Congressional District Maps
Finally, the redistricting process should have a
mechanism for public input and citizen participation, as well as
a sound process for adopting and ratifying congressional
district maps that have been subject to the full scrutiny of the
commission and the public. The commission should maintain
“an open and transparent process enabling full public
consideration of and comment on the drawing of district lines”
throughout the redistricting process.193 There should be some
minimum number of required public hearings to be established
by individual states based on their size.194
Furthermore, a major problem for Arizona’s first round of
independent redistricting was that it lacked a mechanism for
ratification, which made it vulnerable to several rounds of
constitutional challenges, including the current case before the
Court.195 California has attempted to address this problem by
including a constitutional requirement that finalized maps are
subject to a referendum following their certification to the
Secretary of State.196 This requires the state’s voters to approve
CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(e).
Id.
191 Kanefield & O’Grady, supra note 111, at 2.
192 See Ancheta, supra note 22, at 135-36.
193 CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(b)(1).
194 For instance, New York requires 12 public hearings. Proposed Ballot
Propositions, supra note 88.
195 Ariz. Minority Coal. for Fair Redistricting v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting
Comm’n, 284 F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1242 (D. Ariz. 2003); Navajo Nation v. Ariz. Indep.
Redistricting Comm’n, 230 F. Supp. 2d 998, 1002 (D. Ariz. 2002); Kumar, supra note
146, at 666-67; see also Ariz. State Leg., 997 F. Supp. 2d at 1047.
196 CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2; CAL. CONST. art. II, § 9.
189

190
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the final maps. Another option might be to allow the legislature
to overturn the commission’s final maps, but only by a super
majority vote.197 Requiring some degree of legislative approval of
the final maps is likely the safest mechanism for protecting the
constitutionality of an independent redistricting process and
avoiding litigation such as the case currently before the Court.198
4. Federal Agency Oversight
The animating principle of the proposed federal regulation
is that it creates baseline standards for all states while
safeguarding each state’s right to take an active role in deciding
how its redistricting occurs. However, in order to implement these
standards and ensure accountability, there must be some
organization at the federal level to act as a check on state
participation and compliance, as well as to manage and distribute
funding. It is beyond the scope of this discussion to establish the
exact parameters of this federal body. However, HAVA again
provides a helpful model with its creation of the Election
Assistance Commission (EAC), which is a federal agency that
ensures state compliance with HAVA’s minimum requirements
and distributes funding to those participating states.199
The EAC is an independent, bipartisan commission, which
guides states in meeting HAVA’s requirements. As part of this
charge, the EAC develops guidelines, provides information on
election administration, accredits and certifies voting systems,
197 At oral argument in the current case challenging Arizona’s IRC, Justice
Kennedy asked, “[S]uppose you had a . . . law that said that the reapportion
commission . . . must submit its proposal to the legislature, and the legislature has 30 days
and can overturn it only by a three-quarters vote[?]” To which Paul Clement, arguing for the
State of Arizona, replied, “I think, Justice Kennedy, that would be a harder case.” Oral
Argument at 6:04, Ariz. State Leg. v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n (No. 13-1314),
available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2014/2014_13_1314. Another option might
be to delegate redistricting to an independent commission but require legislative approval.
As one report on implementing such a commission in New York noted,

[i]f Article I, § 4, is thought . . . to bar the State from vesting congressional
redistricting authority in a commission, it would be appropriate to mandate
the districting commission to recommend a congressional redistricting plan to
the Legislature, perhaps with some restriction on the Legislature’s discretion
to amend the plan . . . in the event of a court order barring the establishment
of congressional districts by the commission.
Comm. on Election Law, A Proposed New York State Constitutional Amendment to
Emancipate Redistricting from Partisan Gerrymanders: Partisanship Channeled for
Fair Line Drawing, N.Y.C. BAR at 12 (Mar. 2007), available at http://www.nycbar.org/
pdf/report/redistricting_report03071.pdf.
198 Comm. on Election Law, supra note 197.
199 42 U.S.C. §§ 15321-22 (2002); Tokaji, supra note 166, at 205.
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and audits the use of HAVA funds.200 Under HAVA, each state is
eligible to receive federal funding after publishing a plan in the
Federal Register, followed by a 45-day public comment period and
the filing of a certification with the EAC.201 The EAC distributes
the funds accordingly, which states are then able to use to
implement their individual, approved plans.202 Similarly, federal
regulation of redistricting would include the creation of a federal
agency to guide states in implementing independent redistricting
commissions, to review states’ redistricting plans, and to fund
those plans accordingly.
CONCLUSION
The notion that partisan interests have subverted the
redistricting process is nothing new; the term “gerrymandering”
has been in existence for some 200 years, and even the Founders
spoke out against the practice.203 In this century, the Washington
Post runs a contest for its readers to name the laughably shaped
districts that emerged from the decennial redistricting in
2010.204 The corruption of the practice has become so deeply
ingrained, and the conflict of interest runs so deep, that partisan
gerrymandering has become accepted collateral damage for the
machinations of the political process.
While a few states have managed to implement some
measure of independent redistricting, the majority of the nation
continues to allow its elected officials to determine who votes
where. In those states, reform efforts languish. Waiting for each
of these states to garner momentum and develop a framework
for independent redistricting is simply untenable. If six states
have managed to attempt reform in 200 years, the timeframe for
state-by-state redistricting reform is impossibly long, and such
an approach lacks the momentum for meaningful change.
Furthermore, this wait-and-see tactic, in addition to its lack of
efficacy, has led to several different strategies for independent
redistricting, each with varying levels of success. The current
national approach lacks consistency and stability, the implications
of which are that voters are not equally situated across the states.
200 About EAC, U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM’N, http://www.eac.gov/
about_the_eac/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2015).
201 KEVIN J. COLEMAN & ERIC A. FISCHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20898,
THE HELP AMERICA VOTE ACT AND ELECTIONS REFORM: OVERVIEW AND ISSUES 5 (2011),
available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/155625.pdf.
202 Id.
203 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 274 (2004).
204 Blake, supra note 11; Blake, supra note 13.
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Hence, it is incumbent upon the federal government to
implement independent redistricting commissions in every state.
While the obstacles to this federal legislation are no different than
those that challenge the individual states, the popular support
needed to garner momentum for independent redistricting would
have a much further reach when applied to a federal regulation,
rather than a state-by-state effort. A federal scheme to create
uniform standards for independent redistricting would certainly
necessitate a great push from an informed, motivated citizenry.
Yet such a movement is undoubtedly possible, as citizens in every
state tire of partisan gerrymandering and seek to hold their
elected representatives accountable for their failure to implement
real change. As the founder of Common Cause, the “original
citizens’ lobby,”205 once said, “[t]he citizen can bring our political
and governmental institutions back to life, make them responsive
and accountable, and keep them honest. No one else can.”206
Lillian V. Smith†

205 About Us, COMMON CAUSE, http://www.commoncause.org/about/ (last
visited Jan. 21, 2015).
206 Fred Wertheimer, Tax Payer Checkoff Protects Against Corruption, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Apr. 11, 2011, 1:38 PM), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/
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